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  I.  INTRODUCTION  
“The rise of new software platform present regulators and antitrust 
agencies all over the world with a challenge.”1  The transportation company 
Uber Technologies, Inc. is the largest and most current example of this 
phenomenon, as it exemplifies the expansion of the sharing economy without 
a regulatory framework capable of addressing a host of issues.2  
This Note offers a comparative analysis of the issues and challenges 
presented by Uber by focusing, specifically, on those that have emerged in 
Europe and Latin America including the lengthy legal battle that has 
characterized its activity, since its debut back in 2009.3 
This Note highlights how the evolution of markets and technology is 
closely related to law, market forces and the obsolescence of legal rules.4  
This is specifically demonstrated through the comparative law analysis set 
out in this Note, which describes different national approaches with respect 
to the problems raised by Uber: the more open one in the United States 
system and the more restrictive one in Europe and in Latin America.5  
The decision of the Courts —both on the European and Latin America 
side— has represented a setback for the future of the American company.6  
Uber has been a party in many lawsuits and scandals, resulting in “an 
unprecedented polarization of the public opinion, split between defenders of 
the old economy and advocates of the digital revolution.”7  The former have 
 
* Lavinia Meliti is a dual degree J.D. candidate in May 2020 at Nova Southeastern University, 
Shepard Broad College of Law.  She is a 2018 graduate at Roma Tre University, in Rome, Italy, where 
she received her Master’s Postgraduate Degree in Law.  She fluently speaks English, Italian, and Spanish.   
1. Margherita Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Uber: A New Challenge for Regulation 
and Competition Law?, MKT. & COMPETITION L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 1, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042514.  
2. Id. 
3. See Beniamino Pagliaro, La Vita Nuova di Uber: Perché Migliora per i Propri Autisti e 
Cosa Racconta la Sua Evoluzione nel 2017 [Uber's New Life: Why it Improves for its Drivers and What 
its Evolution Tells in 2017], LA STAMPA (Dec. 10, 2017), 
https://www.lastampa.it/economia/2017/12/10/news/la-vita-nuova-di-uber-perche-migliora-per-i-propri-
autisti-e-cosa-racconta-la-sua-evoluzione-nel-2017-1.34081530. 
4. Luca Belviso, Il caso Uber negli Stati Uniti e in Europa fra Mercato, Tecnologia e Diritto: 
Obsolescenza Regolatoria e Ruolo delle Corti [The Uber Case in the United States and Europe Between 
Market, Technology and Law: Regulatory Obsolescence and the Role of the Courts], MEDIA LAWS [M.L.] 
144 (2018). 
5. Id. 
6. Francesco De Masi, The Uber Case: A Ride for the Future of the European Single Market 
(2016/2017) (unpublished E.B.L. thesis, Luiss University) (on file with the Department of Law, Luiss 
University). 
7. Id. 
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accused Uber of unfair competition, and the latter have supported its 
development and fostered technological progress.8  
In order to achieve a full understanding of the Uber phenomenon, the 
Note describes its business model and analyses it from the perspective of the 
European and South American approach, understanding the circumstances 
that allowed “a small Californian start-up, aiming to revolutionize the 
concept of urban transport, to become a technological giant worth billions of 
dollars.”9  This requires an understanding of the American law that allowed 
the rise of Uber.10  The legal issues that arose around Uber do not differ from 
those in other legal systems —such as Europe and Latin America— but 
which have found their original development in the North American Legal 
System.11  
This Note begins with a general overview of the history and 
fundamental characteristics of the Uber phenomenon, from the establishment 
of the company in 2009.12  It also analyzes the wide variety of services 
offered by the American company and the way in which Uber has organized 
its corporate structure, in the world of the Sharing Economy.13  It then 
analyses the major competition law issues raised by the development of the 
Uber platform, and introduces the problems concerning the qualification of 
the service.14  Next it examines the Uber Case experience in Europe, 
specifically in Italy and Spain, and in Latin America, specifically in 
Colombia, and Costa Rica.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Uber and its Business Model: The Sharing Economy 
“Sharing Economy means collaborative economy.”15  It is “an economic 
system in which goods and services are shared between private individuals, 




10. Belviso, supra note 4, at 148.  
11. Id. at 149. 
12. Pagliaro, supra note 3.  
13. See Gianluca Modenese, La Sharing Economy: Il Caso Uber. La Visione Giurisprudenziale 
e Le Prospettive Future [The Sharing Economy: The Uber Case. The Jurisprudential Vision and Future 
Prospects] (2014/2015) (unpublished Econ. & Mgmt. thesis, Università degli Studi di Padova) (on file 
with Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali, Università degli Studi di Padova). 
14. Id. 
15. Belviso, supra note 4, at 145.  
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internet.”16  “The keyword of sharing economy is sharing.”17  Authors 
emphasized its social aspect, made up of community-sharing, describing this 
as a move away from the criteria of maximization of profit that is typical of 
the homo oeconomicus18 in a perspective of classical economy.19  In fact, it 
has been observed how the “sharing economy is not a temporary reaction to 
the crisis, but it is proposed as a structural rethinking of the relationship 
between the economy and society, based on the creation of social links as a 
basis for economic exchange.”20 
Uber is one of the most popular car-sharing service in the world, and 
one of the most striking manifestation of the emergence of the contemporary 
car-sharing economy.21  As to the concept of sharing economy, it is common 
the reference to the “Uberification of Society,” proving the strong relevance 
this market player has, together with its modus operandi and organizational 
structure.22 
Uber is in fact a corporate group, established in the United States and 
operating in numerous cities around the world.23  Founded in San Francisco 
in 2009 —the city that represents the world's largest start-up incubator—24 
Uber soon spread throughout the world,25 achieving considerable success 
while at the same time giving rise to a series of legal disputes.26  Countries 
that are very different from each other, in terms of political regime and free 
market orientation, have alternatively authorized the use of Uber and 
 
16. Sharing Economy, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition 
/sharing_economy (last visited Oct. 5, 2019). 
17. Modenese, supra note 13, at 3. 
18. See Homo Oeconomicus, TRECCANI ENCICLOPEDIA ON LINE, 
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/homo-oeconomicus/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (Homo Oeconomicus, 
first stated by J.S. Mill, stands from abstract simplification of the complex human reality, which places as 
the subject of economic activity an abstract individual, whose actions in the complex social reality can be 
grasped only the economic reasons, linked to the maximization of wealth). 
19. Modenese, supra note 13, at 3. 
20. Ivana Pais & Marta Mainieri, Dossier: Sharing Economy, EQUILIBRI 11, 13 (2015), 
https://www.feem.it/m/publications_pages/20154221147504Indice_AlLettore_Abstracts.pdf. 
21. Modenese, supra note 13, at 2. 
22. Belviso, supra note 4, at 146. 
23. Id. 
24. See San Francisco's 20 Best Startup Accelerators & Incubators, FOUNDER INSTITUTE (Mar. 
1, 2019), https://fi.co/insight/san-francisco-s-20-best-startup-accelerators-incubators. 
25. Avery Harmans & Paige Leskin, The History of How Uber Went from the Most Feared 
Startup in The World to Its Massive IPO, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 18, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-
ie/money/business/the-history-of-how-uber-went-from-the-most-feared-startup-in-the-world-to-its-
massive-ipo/ss-AABAL20. 
26. Modenese, supra note 13, at 11. 
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opposed it.27  The countries where Uber has been sued range from some 
North American States to Spain, from China to Australia, to some areas of 
Latin America to South-East Asia.28 
Uber has produced and marketed a mobile software application (e.g. 
app) on smartphones.29  In the context of urban mobility, the Uber application 
provides the meeting between demand and supply, where the members of the 
community —drivers and users— can contact each other.30  The mobility 
service, provided by the driver, is subject to payment by the user.31  This fee, 
to be paid by credit card, is determined by the Uber group and quantified with 
an automated algorithm according to the surge pricing mechanism, a 
methodology according to which the price of the service increases as demand 
increases.32  Also, the payment is mediated by Uber, which receives the full 
payment amount, deduct the compensation for the services, and gives the 
driver the remaining portion.33  Uber can also evaluate feedbacks given at the 
end of the ride, and in presence of bad reviews, it may deactivate the 
profiles.34  “[A] further feature of Uber's service is that it also provides a 
service with differentiated bands.”35  Other than the basic low-cost option 
that Uber offers, known as Uber X, there are a series of means of transport 
gradually bigger and more luxurious, designed for the different types of 
users.36  In fact, they range from the Uber X service, useful to move from one 
point to another in the city, to planned transport services (which not 
surprisingly Uber defines taxi), and then to services of higher range as the 
Uber Black, where the car is a sedan high-end, or the Uber SUV service, 
provided by a Superior Utility Vehicle, to the top of the range known as the 
Lux service, where flagships of major car manufacturers (e.g. Porsche, 
Mercedes) are offered for transport at very affordable prices.37 
 
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
29. Belviso, supra note 4, at 146. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32.  Nikhil Garg & Hamid Nazerzadeh, Driver Surge Pricing, SSRN 1, 1 (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390346. . 
33. Belviso, supra note 4, at 146. 
34. Id. 
35. Modenese, supra note 13, at 13. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 13–14. 
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As mentioned above, however, Uber has been at the center of a series 
of legal disputes.38  It is therefore to the European and Latin American events 
that the attention must be focused, highlighting on the one hand the 
experience of Italy and Spain and, on the other hand, the experience of 
Colombia and Costa Rica. 
B.  Uber and Competition Law Implications 
This section explains how Uber practices can affect antitrust law.39  
First, Uber does not simply provide technology.40  Uber exists and is 
developing because, by connecting users and drivers through its platform, it 
exploits the interdependencies41 transport demand and driving demand.42  
The Uber platform may seem like a complex architecture, but it is 
actually quite flexible.43  In other words, Uber can diversify its business by 
combining products and services, as it did with Uber Eats.44  Clearly, this has 
consequences in terms of competitive law, as it follows.45  First, because the 
platform is very dynamic, it can easily enter new markets by offering 
increasingly new and innovative services.46  Secondly, because in doing so 
Uber will always be able to profit from strategies that ultimately produce 
exclusive effects for other players in the market, although not necessarily 
anti-competitive.47 
Those who enter the market with the aim of offering already established 
services, find themselves increasing their costs, and forced to use less and 
more accessible technologies, thus reducing the quality of their offer.48  The 
 
38. Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-Ending Stream of Lawsuits, CNN BUS. (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:30 
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber-lawsuits/. 
39. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10 . 
40. Id. 
41. Id.; David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-
Sided Platforms, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 102, 105 (2005). 
42. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10.  
43. Id. 
44. Id.; see also How Does Uber Eats Make Money? Uber Eats Business Model In A Nutshell, 
FOUR WK. MBA, https://fourweekmba.com/uber-eats-business-model/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (in a 
nutshell, Uber Eats is a three-part marketplace that connects a driver, a customer and a restaurant owner 
with the Uber Eats platform, located in the center. This market moves around the three players: drivers 
earn money by delivering orders on time; restaurants pay a commission on orders to Uber; customers pay 
small thick shipping and sometimes cancellation fees).  
45. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10 . 
46. Id. 
47. Id.  
48. Id. at 11. 
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aim of analyzing Uber's competitive behavior is to improve the 
understanding of the strategies implemented by the Californian company, so 
that the antitrust authorities and agencies at global level can have an 
immediate response.49  
As far as Uber practices regarding the pricing system are concerned, the 
competition law has no criticism in this respect.50  The Uber system called 
“surge pricing” —also called the dynamic pricing system— is not anti-
competitive, but adapts perfectly to the system of supply and demand.51  The 
price of the Uber does not change according to the price of the person who 
buys the service, but according to other elements such as the price of 
competitors, the correspondence between supply and demand, or other 
external elements such as the conditions of transport.52  In other words, if the 
Uber algorithm works as it says, reflecting how market supply and demand 
change, there is no collusion, and therefore antitrust law cannot change the 
barriers to entry that protects Uber's market power.53  In addition, Uber 
collects user data through its platform, in order to retain its consumers.54  In 
doing so, it improves its services, consumer welfare, and therefore profits, 
and this is not prohibited by antitrust law.55  The mere existence of Uber and 
its economic activity does not appear to be anti-competitive, as it does not 
harm the welfare of consumers.56  The purpose of competition law and 
agencies is to make markets work, not to protect competitors.57  Competition 
law can only prohibit anti-competitive agreements, mergers and 
monopolistic practices.58  Clearly, this does not mean that antitrust agencies 
and authorities support companies that act in violation of the law.59  As to the 
context of the battle that taxi drivers are waging against Uber, the aim of the 
antitrust agencies is to create a single level playing field for Uber and taxi 
drivers.60  Additionally, those agencies cannot prescribe obligations and 
 
49. Id. 




54. Id. at 12. 
55. Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 12. 
56. Id. 
57. Id.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60.  Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 12. 
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force, for example, Uber to comply with taxi regulations, nor can they exempt 
taxi drivers from those regulatory obligations to which Uber is not subject.61  
As a result, it looks like the Uber problem is a regulatory problem.62  
The central issue is whether and how to apply to Uber the same requirements 
and obligations applied to taxi drivers.63  There are two solutions: to extend 
the existing rules to the new emerging system, or to use the new system to 
innovate the first.64  It would not seem right to waste opportunities the Uber 
is offering, applying the same rules as traditional operators.65  Rather, it is 
important to boost progress and development.66  Legislators should allow 
traditional services to exploit new technologies and innovate.67  “[T]he best 
way to fight illegal business models is to develop legal business models that 
are equally good and efficient.”68 
III.  UBER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
A.  Uber in the United States: Where Everything Started 
As to the Uber case, the American law deserves special consideration.69  
The first reason for polarizing the attention towards the American legal 
system, is the very origins of this market operator.70  Uber was founded in 
2009 California, starting from 2010 to operate in several cities, such as San 
Francisco, New York City, Chicago, Washington.71 
At first, the American company established itself in the north-American 
context, where it provided a new idea of mobility, with lower and competitive 
prices compared with the ones of the professionals in the sector.72  It is in 
those cities that the first resistance from taxi drivers has inevitably developed, 
and where certain legal issues have emerged.73  These are problems which, 
as we shall see, do not differ from those found in other legal systems —such 
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 14. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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as Europe and Latin America— but which have found their original 
development in the North American legal system.74 
American regulation on urban mobility is affected by the federal 
structure of the North American legal system, which is divided into three 
distinct levels of government: federal, state and municipal.75  In the area of 
taxi service, and from a regulatory point of view, the real protagonists that 
intervened have been the federal states and the various municipalities.76  On 
that regard, it is possible to detect heterogeneity in the different regulatory 
models adopted by American cities.77  First, the provision of a system of 
licenses, which confers on the municipality the power to issue licenses 
beyond the predetermined number at the State level (e.g. in Los Angeles).78  
Second, the existence of tariff regimes, which sometimes are predetermined 
(as in San Diego and New York City), others not yet characterized by any 
type of public intervention.79  Third, the “presence of service obligations, 
such as that of providing the requested activity without being able to refuse,” 
even if uneconomical, or that of offering services of a limited nature also to 
residents of disadvantaged areas.80 
The advent of Uber, as already noted, has generated strong resistance 
from traditional operators and, sometimes, even interventions by the courts.81  
Uber, carrying out an activity of intermediation, has ultimately satisfied the 
same need for urban mobility that the taxi drivers have provided.82  For that 
reason, Uber’s main accusation has been that of configuring a hypothesis of 
unfair competition.83  First, the competitive advantage gained despite the lack 
of homologation, violating the rules relating to the taxi service; second, the 
nature of the activity itself which, as mentioned, is not dissimilar to the one 
carried out by the traditional operators of the sector.84 
 
74. Belviso, supra note 4, at 149. 
75.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
76. Belviso, supra note 4, at 149. 




81. Belviso, supra note 4, at 150; see also Yellow Grp. LLC v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 12 C 7967, 
2014 WL 3396055, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014) (alleging unfair and deceptive acts, misrepresentation, 
and unfair competition by Uber). 
82. Belviso, supra note 4, at 150–51. 
83. Id. at 151.; see also Hannah Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should Regulators 
Impose Über Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 418 (2016). 
84. Belviso, supra note 4, at 151. 
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Another accusation against Uber has been that of not belonging to the 
sharing economy world, whereas those platforms are characterized by the 
spirit of sharing, and Uber is allegedly not.85  An example is Anchorage, 
Alaska, where it was challenged the legitimacy of the service before the 
Superior Court, seeking to impose the performance of the activity in 
conditions of substantial gratuitousness, therefore without profit margins for 
the company.86  This claim was affirmed by Judge Micheal Corey of the 
Anchorage Superior Court, and, inevitably, ended up with the choice of Uber 
to inhibit the service on the territory.87 
Because municipalities regulate the taxi industry, having their own 
autonomy, each of them has their own ideas as to how Uber fits into their 
regulatory frameworks, and as to whether or not Uber should be challenged 
or rather accepted.88  Some municipalities were favorable and aimed at not 
hindering the entry of the new operator, as happened in Pittsburgh; some 
others, hostile to the rise of the new entrant and inclined to extend to it the 
rules already applicable to traditional carriers (such as in New York City);89 
and finally, municipalities that, fostering innovation, decided to regulate the 
new platform, while avoiding to prevent its effective operability.90  This last 
option has been implemented by several States, since it is capable —at least 
in theory— of balancing the interest in technological innovation and in the 
development of the market.91  Some of these states —such as California, 
Colorado, Nevada, Massachusetts— have created from 2013, the category of 
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), in which Uber and all those 




86. Id.  
87. Id. 
88. Posen, supra note 83, at 423. 
89. See Richard Cohen, Uber Mows Down Bill De Blasio, THE WASH. POST (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ubers-bare-knuckle-battle-against-the-taxi-
industry/2015/07/27/e0e7be98-3483-11e5-8e6607b4603ec92a_story.html?utm_term=.1c7663d78c95. 
(in New York City, the Mayor Bill De Blasio has proposed to introduce, also for the drivers of Uber, the 
obligation to acquire a license, suggesting the idea of establishing, even for them, a regulated system of 
entry into the market.  This proposal was not appreciated by Uber, who decided to include, in his app, 
next to the ordinary display mode of the drivers, a fictitious “De Blasio mode,” in order to show the user 
what would have happened if the proposal of the Mayor had been accepted, with the disappearance of 
cars in circulation and the communication of a waiting time of 25 minutes). 
90. Belviso, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
91. Id. at 152. 
92. Id.; see also Jeremy Horpedahl, Ideology Über Alles? Economics Bloggers on Uber, Lyft, 
and Other Transportation Network Companies, ECON. J. WATCH, 360 (2015). 
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Nonetheless, the overall picture seems to be constituted by a myriad of 
facets, derived also by the federal structure of the United States.93  When the 
taxi industry was first regulated, no one could have imagined ridesharing 
services like Uber, as a result of technology and innovation.94  As a 
consequence, it is up to the States to support the experience and the services 
that Uber provides.95  “Society is forever evolving and it is in the best interest 
of the country, consumers, businesses, and the government to allow these 
new companies to innovate.”96  
B.  Uber in Europe: A General Background 
“Information technology and Internet services are considered to be key 
tools for economic growth and innovation in the European Union.”97  The 
strategy for the digital single market has been set out by the Commission's 
Communication, which highlighted that in order to complete the internal 
market, it is necessary to remove barriers and fill the remaining regulatory 
gaps.98  The full implementation of the digital market, offered directly online 
or through applications on Internet, is in fact still limited by restriction 
measures put in place by States and private behaviors, introducing obstacles 
to its development.99  Moreover, it was rightly pointed out that “technologies 
move too quickly for regulatory comfort.”100  As a result, the European Union 
system, together with the member States, are now in front of the need of 
regulating previously non-existent or even inconceivable cases, that have 
transnational relevance.101 
Today, as to the non-scheduled urban transport, the European regulatory 
scenario seems to be highly regulated.102  This picture tends to be 
homogeneous, as it is characterized by “licensing systems, quotas, 
administrative tariffs, public service obligations and strict distinctions 
between taxi services and rental services with drivers.”103 
 
93. Belviso, supra note 4, at 152. 
94. Posen, supra note 83, at 432. 
95. Belviso, supra note 4, at 152. 
96. Posen, supra note 83, at 433. 
97. Gianpaolo Maria Ruotolo, Il caso Uber nel mercato unico digitale [The Uber Case in the 




101. Id. at 430. 
102. Belviso, supra note 4, at 152. 
103. Id.  
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After the new economic operator entered the market, there has been a 
trend towards homogeneity.104  Specifically, after the entrance of Uber in the 
most important cities in Europe, in fact, it followed “the claims of the 
traditional operators of the sector, then the actions of the various 
administrations involved, and finally the decisions taken by the national 
courts, almost never willing to accept the requests of the exponents of the 
new economy.”105 
This attitude of closure has not only affected the Uberpop service, but 
also to the Uberblack service.106  The former —Uberpop— is a service of 
intermediation between non-professional drivers and users.107  This service 
is, as it is easy to assume, the one that has generated more problems, because 
of the greater detachment that characterizes its offer, compared to that 
traditionally made within the market.108  As to the second one —Uberblack— 
“is a service of intermediation between professional drivers and users: 
through this service, drivers already holders of NCC authorization (e.g. 
noleggio con conducente), and therefore professionals, also become drivers 
of Uber, offering a service additional and parallel to the traditional one.”109 
The judges found themselves having to interpret the nature of the 
activity carried out by Uber, in order to understand if, behind the guise of 
inter-electronic mediation, lies, indeed, a substantial transport activity, and 
unfair competitive practices.110  Specifically, as part of the ongoing battle of 
the Uber with the European Union (EU), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
was tasked with understanding how the activity of the Uber can be classified: 
whether to classify it as a provider of transport, or services, and, therefore, 
how it should be regulated.111  Uber has tried to impose its business model 
and technological innovation throughout Europe, with a value of more than 
40 billion dollars.112  As a response, it has been strong the resistance of the 
European Community, considering the tactics implemented by Uber to be 
 
104. Id. at 153. 
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Belviso, supra note 4, at 153. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Belviso, supra note 4, at 156. 
111. Ijechi Nazirah Nwaozuzu, Goliath v. Goliath: The Significance of EU Law in the Battle 
Between Uber and the EU (2017) (unpublished thesis, National University of Singapore) (on file with 
National University of Singapore), https://www.academia.edu/36473387/ 
Goliath_v_Goliath_The_significance_of_EU_Law_in_the_battle_between_Uber_and_the_EU (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
112. Id. 
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anti-competitive.113  The legal actions taken by the national authorities offer 
important insights into the battle against Uber.114  Accordingly, it is important 
to illustrate the experience of the main states belonging to the European 
Union and, in the next section, analyze how the Commission, the Member 
States, and Uber have acted in the Uber battle against the European Union, 
in their respective interests, focusing the attention on the Spanish and Italian 
experience.115 
In France, where Uber has taken its first steps, the adoption of the 2014 
Thèvenoud Law116 has re-regulated the non-scheduled urban transport sector 
through several changes to the original transport code.117  It is precisely on 
the basis of these provisions introduced therein that the Cour d'Appel de 
Paris has inhibited the provision of the Uberpop service, considered a form 
of unfair competition.118  As to Germany, there is a highly administered 
market and courts, both administrative and civil, have placed themselves in 
a position of clear closure vis-à-vis the new market player.119  In the 
Netherlands, which as a matter of fact is characterized by a more liberal 
system, the Uberpop service has been inhibited.120  In Italy, it is before the 
courts that the terrain of conflict between traditional carriers and the new 
entrant has developed.121  Specifically, the intervention concerned both the 
Uberblack service and the Uberpop service.122  However, only with reference 
to the latter service did the ordinary judge come to configure the unfair 
competition and inhibit the assets of the service.123  Finally, in Spain, there is 
also here a market full of rules and hostile jurisprudence that inhibits the 
services offered by the new entrant, as we will see in the next paragraph.124  
However, before discussing the specifics of decisions taken at the 
judicial level, it is necessary to explain the internal decision-making 




115.  Id. 
116. See Loi 2014-1104 du 1 octobre 2014 relative aux taxis et aux voitures de transport avec 
chauffeur [Law 2014-1104 of October 1, 2014 relative to taxis and transport vehicles with driver], 
LEGIFRANCE, Oct. 2, 2014, p. 15938. 
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124. Id. at 156. 
344064-ILSA_International_26-3_Text.indd   69 9/23/20   9:12 AM
            ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law      [Vol. 26.3 
 
458 
European Union).125  The European Law allows National Courts to decide on 
matters that directly affect the Member State at issue.126  Then, the European 
authorities of competence, and, thus, the European Law, act as a mechanism 
to control the proportionality and validity of decisions and actions taken at 
National level.127  Specifically, Article 12(3) of Directive 2006/123/EC (e.g. 
the Services Directive) and Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/31/EC (e.g. the 
Electronic Commerce Directive) grant national authorities and, therefore, 
Member States, the power to regulate matters occurring at national level, 
provided that they do not conflict with the European Directives.128  
As to Uber, the Advocate General has declared that, according to the 
Directive 98/34/CE5, the Member States “may prohibit and punish as a 
matter of criminal law, the illegal exercise of [UberPop] transport activities . 
. . without notifying the Commission of the draft law in advance.”129  
Nevertheless, this Opinion has two sides to be considered.130  On the one 
hand, it gives Member States a very strong power to implement regulations 
against Uber's anti-competitive strategies.131  On the other hand, the adequacy 
of the actions taken within this power must be assessed.132  The objective of 
the Advocate General, through this Opinion, was to allow the national 
authorities to directly regulate the anti-competitive tactics of Uber.133  
However, this Opinion has been considered dangerous, because it may 
introduce a precedent whereby National Authorities may regulate internal 
matters by applying national laws even before binding European 
directives.134  Therefore, the European Commission135 considered it 
appropriate to stress that national authorities should adopt proportionate 
measures in the context of the battle against Uber.136  The European 
Commission has in fact clarified that the bans and prohibitions —as to the 
Directive 98/34/CE5— “can only be used as a last resort.”137  However, the 
 
125. See Nwaozuzu, supra note 111. 
126. Id. at 2. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id.; see also Case C-320/16, Uber France SAS, 2017 E.C.R. I-X.  





135. See A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 2, 
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2001_en.htm. 
136. See Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 4. 
137. Id. 
344064-ILSA_International_26-3_Text.indd   70 9/23/20   9:12 AM
2020] Meliti  
 
459 
States, in response, claimed that Uber's anti-competitive tactics were so 
serious and obvious that imposing bans was the only possible way out.138  
The decision expressed by the European Commission has therefore had the 
objective of favoring, in some way, the international companies that seek to 
enter the single market, while protecting the public interests of the national 
authorities.139  “EU Law’s ability to check these measures thus serves to not 
only protect genuine public concerns within Member States, but also to 
ensure that measures set against anti-competitive tactics are both valid and 
effective in meeting their objectives.”140 
“Uber's strategy in entering the single market, . . . was to radically 
change the status quo and make the market bend.”141  In response, European 
law has verified and balanced the measures taken at national level against 
Uber, seeking to ensure that the same measures could guarantee a balance of 
competing values.142  In fact, “the battle between the European Union and 
Uber appears to be rooted in a conflict of values.”143  The European Court, 
on the one hand, seeks to balance the freedom of services, respect for 
competition rules, and consumer protection.144  Uber, on the other hand, tries 
to fight for the freedom of its consumers.145 
Uber will continue to fight for its place in the single market.146  The 
European Union has the objective of creating a digital single market by 2020, 
and one may finally see how the future battles between the Uber and the EU 
will proceed to enforce EU law in its current form, or modify it 
definitively.147 
 
138. Id.  
139. Id. at 5. 
140. Id.  
141. Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 5; see Elias Isquith, Uber fail: Why the Start-up Giant 
Stumbled in Europe — and How it Could Happen in the U.S., SALON (June 1, 2016), 
https://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/uber_fail_why_the_start_up_giant_stumbled_in_europe_and_how_i
t_could_ happen_in_the_u_s/. 
142. Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 6. 
143. Id. at 5. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 8. 
147. Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 8. 
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1.  The Experience in Spain 
As happened in other countries, in Spain one accusation is directed at 
Uber: unfair competitor.148  The Spanish experience will go from the Spanish 
courts up to the European Court of Justice.149  Before discussing the Uber 
case in Spain, it is important to present a brief regulatory analysis of 
competition law, in order to understand the Spanish experience.150  
One of the most important constitutional principles —Article 38 of the 
Spanish Constitution— is the freedom of enterprise, with respect to which 
the public authorities guarantee and protect its exercise.151  This regulation 
implies, among other things, the prevention and eradication of a series of acts 
that distort competition in the market, affecting both market participants on 
the supply side (companies, intermediaries and other producers) and on the 
demand side (consumers and users).152  These type of practices —known as 
unfair— are widely regulated by the Spanish Law of Unfair Competition 
3/1991.153  Specifically, Article 15 deals with the violation of the 
aforementioned rules.154  The latter state that it is considered unfair to prevail 
on the market, thanks to a competitive advantage acquired through the 
violation of the laws, and to apply the law the advantage must be 
significant.155  In fact, the second part of this Note makes us understand that 
not all legal violations are, by extension, a source of unfair competition.156  
After having analyzed the Spanish experience, we can now turn on the 
Uber case.157  As we will see, the Spanish experience appears to be very 
similar to the Italian one.158  On October 2014, an association of taxi drivers 
in Barcelona (e.g. Elite Taxi) brought an action before the Barcelona 
Commercial Court (e.g. Juzgado de lo Mercantil n. 3 de Barcelona), against 
Uber (rectius, Uber Systems Spain S.L.), on several grounds.159  The first 
 
148. Alejandro Fernández Ortega, El Caso Uber: Discusión de la Problemática y Análisis 
Jurídico [Uber case: Discussion of the Problem and Legal Analysis] (Jan. 20, 2016) (unpublished thesis, 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) (on file with Facultat de Dret, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona). 
149. See Id. 
150. Id. at 16. 
151. Id.; see also C.E., art. 38, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain). 
152. Fernández, supra note 148, at 16. 
153. Id.; see Unfair Competition Law (B.O.E. 1991, 3) (Spain). 
154. Fernández, supra note 148, at 16.  
155. Id. at 17. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. at 18.  
158. Id. at 11. 
159. Belviso, supra note 4, at 157. 
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claim was that of Uber infringing on the rules of non-scheduled urban 
transport —Article 4 of Law 19/2003— which prescribes the obligation to 
obtain a license and authorization to carry out transport activities in a 
speculative, urban and inter-urban manner.160  Second, the association 
claimed that there were the elements to think that Uber’s activities were 
creating unfair competition, in violation of Law 3/1991 of the Spanish 
Competition Law (e.g. Competencia Desleal).161  For these reasons, the 
association asked the Court to order the company to cease its activity.162  The 
commercial Court before which the case was brought, however, had doubts 
as to whether that type of service was correctly placed on the market.163  In 
other words, the issue was defining whether Uber was a provider of a 
smartphone app connecting drivers and users, or a transport provider.164  This 
question was referred directly from the Spanish Court to the European Court 
of Justice, with the aim of defining whether the Uber service should be 
regarded as a transport service —pursuant to Article 58 of the TFEU, or as 
“an electronic mediation service belonging to the information society”— 
pursuant to Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123/EU, Directive 2000/31/EC 
and Directive 98/34/EC.165 
In its judgment of December 20, 2017 the European Court of Justice 
pointed out that the company creates an offer of urban transport services by 
technological means, e.g. its application, while not denying that Uber is an 
intermediary between drivers and customers.166  Without the latter, drivers 
would not be able to provide transport services.167  Thus, the Court 
highlighted the relationship of instrumentality that exists between 






164. Belvisio, supra note 4, at 157. 
165. Id.  In order to have a precise legal framework and to understand the decision of the 
European Court, here a brief analysis of the laws at issue.  First, Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union is one of vital importance, as it embodies the principle of the freedom to provide 
services in the European law.  This provision prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services 
within the EU. In this respect, Directive 2006/123/EC defines the instruments to promote the freedom of 
establishment and the free movement of service providers.  On the other hand, Directive 98/34/EC of the 
European Parliament lays down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
standards and regulations.  Finally, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament deals with certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce.  Id. 
166. Belvisio, supra note 4, at 157. 
167. Id. 
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not the first.”168  Moreover, “Uber exercises a decisive influence on the 
performance of such drivers: establishing prices, intermediate payment, 
controlling the conduct of drivers and also being able to decide to also 
deactivate their profiles.”169  Such characteristics of the service rendered by 
Uber show, even more clearly, their functional inseparability.170 
Finally, the Court pointed out that the European concept of service in 
the transport sector must be understood broadly “including not only transport 
services considered as such, but also any service connected to a physical act 
of transferring people or goods from one place to another through a means of 
transport.”171  Accordingly, its activity must be subject to the entire Title VI 
of the TFEU devoted to transport, and Article 58 TFEU, which deals with 
the European rules on transport.172  However, transport is a matter of shared 
competence, where both the European Union and the Member States may 
adopt legal acts which are binding on them, and where the states have 
competence where Union has not exercised it.173  In the absence of European 
provisions on urban transport, the European Court of Justice can only hold 
by stating that it is up to the Member States to regulate the conditions for the 
provision of services which are, formally speaking, linked to intermediation 
and, essentially, to mobility.174 
This issue has been fundamental in the European Union.175  The position 
of the Court of Justice on these aspects affected the outcome of the Uber case 
and its establishment in Spain, but also the rules of the European game, 
creates a precedent in the EU countries.176 
In this context, “the European institutions have shown their interest in 
strengthening the links between the digital economy and the single 
market.”177  The Spanish professor and philosopher José Ortega y Gasset said 
that “it is only possible to progress when you think big, you can only move 
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2.  The Experience in Italy 
Before analyzing the solutions suggested by and adopted by the Italian 
Court, we must reiterate that the service which the consumer accesses on 
Uber is actually composed of two distinct parts: on the one hand, in fact, they 
use the digital platform installed on smartphones in order to book the journey, 
choose the route and pay; on the other hand, the same customer actually 
benefits from a transport service.179  It is, therefore, a composite case in which 
one of the two activities, taking place online on the platform, could actually 
fall into the category of intermediation, while the other falls, without doubt, 
in the category of passenger transport.180 
First of all, it is important to remember that the judicial events in Italy 
“did not concern Uber sic et simpliciter, but rather a specific service offered 
by Uber —Uber Pop— with which it is actually offered . . . a service in many 
ways similar to that of the traditional taxi.”181  “The difference is that the 
Uber driver does not possess any professional license, but simply some basic 
requirements imposed from the Californian society (e.g. driving license for 
at least three years and without ever having had suspensions, criminal record, 
etcetera).”182  It follows, that Uberpop —standing for “peer-to-peer rideshare 
service”— allows the customer to share the use of the vehicle with the driver 
and owner of the same vehicle, by simply paying a fee.183  
In the spring of 2015, taxi trade unions in Milan, Genoa, and Turin 
brought proceedings before the Court of Milan to request an order to 
terminate Uber's activities in the Italian territory.184  They alleged that 
UberPop, through its app, was engaged in unfair competition in the taxi 
market, selling public transport services at much lower prices, and at the 
same time, without having to comply with the mandatory requirements 
imposed on taxi drivers.185  Accordingly, a decision was necessary and 
urgent, as the appellants feared, in the long term, a large loss in profits.186  
The Court of Milan therefore ruled, on May 25th, 2015, in favor of the 
applicants.187  Specifically, the Court ordered UberPop to cease its activities 
 
179. Ruotolo, supra note 97, at 435. 
180. Damien Geradin, Online Intermediation Platforms and Free Trade Principles – Some 
Reflections on the Uber Preliminary Ruling Case, SSRN 1, 3 (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2759379. 
181. Modenese, supra note 13, at 14. 
182. Id. 
183. Geradin, supra note 181, at 4. 
184. Alessio Di Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, IT. L. J., 177, 177 (2016). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 177–78. 
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on the Italian market immediately.188  Uber, in its defensive arguments, 
firmly stated that its activity was not a transport activity, but simply a 
technological platform.189  Specifically, Uber stated that its UberPop app was 
limited to create an intermediation between drivers and passengers, and that 
Uber had nothing to do with the relationship between them, or the activity 
carried out.190  As a result of this, Uber claimed that it operates in a 
completely different market, and that limiting its access to the Italian market 
would be in breach of European principles of competition law, and of Italian 
competition law.191  In response, the Italian Court had first noted that the 
services provided by Uber cannot be qualified as a simple intermediation tool 
to facilitate car sharing with other passengers.192  Accordingly, the Court 
outlined the difference: while in car-sharing services the car is shared with 
other passengers, who contribute to the costs (e.g. fuel, management costs, 
tolls), UberPop offers the possibility to motorists to sell a transport service 
for profit.193  For the foregoing reasons, the role of Uber cannot be considered 
extraneous, especially since it has the possibility to influence the prices of 
the service, which are calculated through the mechanism of Surge Pricing 
(e.g. increase of the tariff to the increase in demand).194  On the basis of these 
considerations, the Court of Milan found it undisputable that the Uber market 
is not different from that of taxis, as UberPop satisfies in equal measure the 
same service offered by taxis.195  However, while taxi drivers have to meet 
tough requirements (e.g. car inspections, special insurance, taxi license, et 
cetera), UberPop drivers do not have to meet the same requirements.196  By 
doing so, UberPop drivers can make a profit out of offering services at better 
prices, thus saving costs.197  This is one of the main reasons why the Court of 
Milan observed that the UberPop service is substantially contrary to 
European and Italian principles of competition.198  
Furthermore, the purpose of the detailed regulation of taxis is to protect 
the health and safety of customers, which is why taxi vehicles are periodically 
checked, the taxi driver undergoes periodic examinations to verify their 
 
188. Id. at 178.  
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physical and mental capacity, and there is adequate insurance for 
passengers.199  The fact that Uber escapes these requirements, as stated by 
the Court of Milan, is unacceptable and contrary to the law.200  The value of 
personal safety is the value that —according to the Court— prevails over the 
value of the market.201  This is affirmed by Article 41 of the Italian 
Constitution,202 and by Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.203 
Uber’s Italian General Manager, Carlo Tursi, asserted how Uber entered 
the Italian market with a fairly ambitious project: to offer Italians an 
alternative service and quality in the mobility.204  What Uber hopes in Italy 
is to finally witness an update of the legislation in the sector.205  The initial 
goal is to introduce a low-cost transport services, facilitate the mobility, thus 
helping the communities where transport innovation is needed the most.206  
The final goal is to change the way Italians think about transportation, where 
having a car is a choice, rather than an obligation.207 
C.  Uber in Latin America: The Fastest Growing Region in the World 
Latin America208 has faced and continues to face many problems related 
to urban transport and urban mobility, given the absence and inefficiency of 
public service, informal transport systems, congestion, road accidents, and 
pollution.209  All of this clearly has different impacts in different cities.210  As 
a matter of fact, Latin America is a region of social inequality, dominated by 
 
199. Di Amato, supra note 184, at 179. 
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different social classes, and transport accessibility problems have a different 
impact.211  What the whole region has in common is the process of 
accelerated urbanization, and a very large percentage of urban population.212  
There has been incredible urbanization in Latin America in the last 40 years, 
and the urban population has grown from 50% of the population in 1970, to 
80% in 2013.213  As a result of the urbanization process, as many cities were 
born, they were not able to face the transport system in an organized and 
planned manner.214  The supply of public transport has not kept pace with the 
growth in demand for transport.215  This increase in transport demand has 
inevitably generated an increase in the number of cars in most cities.216  As a 
result, income has grown and there has been a great expansion in the 
production of cars and motorcycles, with an average of about 90 vehicles per 
1000 inhabitants.217  The rate of motorization exceeds that of the Middle East, 
Asia, and Africa.218  Unfortunately, institutional weakness and government 
control have not been able to respond promptly to these needs, thus 
contributing to chaos and security.219  In order to address these difficulties, 
some major cities have taken steps to promote progress in an effort to 
improve mobility conditions.220  Brazil, and in particular cities such as 
Curitiba, have implemented innovative and integrated forms of transport.221  
The city of Medellin, Colombia, continuously incorporates new and 
innovative forms of transport, also and above all thanks to the new Mayor 
Federico Gutiérrez.222 
Latin America is Uber’s most profitable region and fastest growing 
region in the world.223  Active riders amount to twenty-five million per 
month, in more than two-hundred metropolitan areas in the fifteen countries 
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of Latin America.224  The success of the Uber company in Latin America is 
due to several reasons.225  First, it is its own technological platform and 
experience.226  Second, it is the important need for change in the transport 
service, given the large number of South American population.227  In 
addition, the geographical and cultural proximity to the global base of the 
American Uber, as well as the similarities in terms of technological 
preferences between Latin America and America, is what places Uber in this 
competitive position.228 
Nonetheless, in many regions Uber remain unregulated, operating 
without the support of local governments, or even worse, directly against the 
governments.229  Despite its parallel growth in the rest of the world, 
especially in the United States, Uber in Latin America has encountered 
significant resistance and conflict, with uncertainties about its future.230  A 
major factor is that the issue of mobility in Latin America, which is 
controversial.231  The impact and growth of Uber has been so great because 
of the great need for change that cities have required.232  However, the 
absence of regulations on the topic places Uber as a man with no land, where 
it has not received express consent from the government.233  The general 
motivation of animosity and conflict of “taxi drivers against Uber in Latin 
America is simple: Uber is taking away [its] customers . . . .”234  Despite the 
turmoil surrounding Uber and the absence of regulation, Uber continues to 
expand aggressively, although aware of the insidious situation.235    
Uber's presence in Latin America is wide, and the public has welcomed 
a large and positive change in the old transport.236  It is up to local 
governments to take action and try to mediate between the idea of an old 
transport system and new technologies.237  Humberto Pacheco —Uber’s 
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this isn't a question of Uber, it's a question of smart cities.  It's a question of 
progress and development, of how people can really benefit from the changes 
technology will bring . . . .”238 
1.  The Experience in Colombia 
In order to understand the regulatory issues that have arisen in 
Colombia, it is again important to point out the laws that underlie the right of 
transport in the country.239  The starting point is Article 5 of Law 336/1996, 
by which the National Transport Statute is adopted.240  Specifically, it 
illustrates the difference between the public and private service.241  Essential 
public service, in Colombia, is granted by law to public transportation 
companies.242  As a result, it will imply the priority of the general public 
interest over the individual’s interest, for example, the guarantee of the 
provision of the service, and the protection of users, according to the rights 
and obligations indicated in the Statute herein.243   
As to private service, the same article places the private transport service 
in this regulatory scenario.244  It points out how “the private transport is one 
that tends to satisfy the needs of mobilization of persons or things, within the 
scope of the exclusive activities of natural and/or legal persons.”245  As such, 
private transport companies “must comply with the regulations established 
by the Department of Transportation.”246    
Article 9 of Law 105/1993 applies sanctions in case of violations.247  It 
states that the transportation will impose sanctions for violation to the 
regulating norms of the transport, according to the special dispositions that 
govern each mode of transport.248  In other words, the National Transport 
Statute will come into play in case of violation of transport regulations.249  
Whoever contracts, provides or drives private vehicles or equipment, uses 
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transport infrastructure, violates or facilitates the violation of regulations, 
will be subject to the sanctions provided for in Article 9 of Law 336/1996.250  
In addition to the foregoing, Article 131 of Law 769/2002, whereby the 
National Land Transit Code (e.g. Código Nacional de Tránsito Terrestre) is 
issued, as amended by Article 21 of Law 1383/2010, provides that violators 
of traffic regulations will be sanctioned with the imposition of fines, 
according to the type of infraction.251  For example, the driver and/or owner 
of a motor vehicle that incurs any of the aforementioned infractions will be 
sanctioned with a fine equivalent to thirty current legal minimum wages.252 
“When Uber arrived in Colombia in October 2013, the concept of a 
private transport service mediated by an app was as new as it was challenging 
to the country's regulatory framework.”253   In 2016, the Superintendence of 
Ports and Transportation (e.g. Superintendencia de Puertos y Transporte), 
sanctioned the company Uber Colombia S.A.S. with a fine of COP 
$344,727,000 for failing to comply with the order to cease the facilitation 
and promotion of the provision of unauthorized transport services in 
Colombia.254  “On August 19, 2016, the Delegate of Transit and Transport, 
after having previously sanctioned Uber Colombia S.A.S. for facilitating the 
violation of rules on passenger transportation, ordered the company to stop 
promoting, through mass media and advertising, the use of the technological 
platform that allows the illegal provision of the service.”255  Notwithstanding 
the order, the Superintendence found that Uber Colombia S.A.S. was still 
promoting the use of the platform.256  For example, back in November 2nd, 
2016, Uber S.A.S. was ordered to stop promoting its unauthorized 
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Aerocali S.A.257  Specifically, the Superintendence of Ports and Transport 
ordered Aerocali S.A., administrator of the Alfonso Bonilla Aragón Airport, 
“to guarantee immediate compliance with the instruction given by the entity 
last August 19th, through Resolution 40313.”258  The Resolution required 
“compliance with the regulations that prohibit the facilitation and/or 
promotion of the provision of unauthorized transportation services 
throughout the country.”259 
The Santos government, through its Department of Transportation, 
called the platform illegal and the police chased those who used it.260  In 
December 2018, the Department of Transportation issued a circular in which 
it reiterated to the transit authorities of the country that all drivers violating 
Article 26 of Law 769/2002, for example, providing public transport service 
with private vehicles without a reasonable cause, must have their driver’s 
license suspended.261  Private drivers using their vehicles for the illegal 
provision of public passenger transport, will have their driving license 
cancelled and will only be able to apply for it again in 25 years later.262  
With the arrival of the government of Iván Duque, who has expressed 
his interest in promoting the so-called orange economy, the possibility of a 
path towards legalization has been raised.263  Nonetheless, that did not 
prevent the Department of Transportation —e.g. Ministerio de Transporte— 
from persecuting those who derive their incomes from Uber’s activities, as 
public transport service using a private car, against the aforementioned 
laws.264  “In at least one case, that led to an Uber driver having his license 
taken away for 25 years.”265 
Then on January 15, 2019, the legal office of the Colombian Department 
of Transportation intervened as to the legality of Uber.266  First, it is important 
to note that, in accordance with Article 8.1 and 8.8 of the Decree 087 of 
January 17th, 2011, the legal advisory office of the Department of 
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Transportation has the duty to advise and/or assist the Department and other 
dependencies of the Department in the application and interpretation of 
constitutional and legal norms.267  The office deals with and resolves 
inquiries and petitions submitted to the Department by persons of a public or 
private nature.268  In the case discussed here, the office responded to a petition 
presented by a private individual to the Department of Transportation, 
through file No. 20183030126012 of December 17, 2018.269  Specifically, it 
has been inquired whether it is legal for a citizen to contact and contract 
transport services offered by a vehicle that is attached to Uber.270  The office 
has explained that Uber —although it defines itself a technological platform, 
not providing transportation service— is not recognized by the Ministry of 
Transport as a technological platform in the terms of paragraph 4 of article 
2.2.1.3.2.1. of Decree 1079 of 2015 and articles 5 and 6 of Resolution No 
2163 of 2016 issued by the Ministry of Transport.271  The Ministry of 
Transport has issued the Circular No. 24 dated December 30th, 2014, 
requesting “the immobilization of private and public service vehicles that 
provide unauthorized service through the “Uber” platform,” for failure to 
comply with the regulatory provisions of the Ministry of Transport and, in 
particular the aforementioned Circular, resulting in appropriate 
administrative inquiries and the imposition of any penalties.272 
Luis Lopez, Uber's public affairs manager, argued to the contrary that 
Uber is a private service.273  Specifically, “Uber calls it Private Transport by 
Intermediate Platforms (PTIP) and considers it a new category of 
transport.”274  According to data from Uber’s headquarters in the United 
States, Uber in Colombia has about “83,000 drivers and is used monthly by 
about 2.1 million passengers.”275  “For Uber, the satisfaction of its users goes 
to the heart of its commercial proposal, and is essential for its long-term 
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for the region, managed from its Experience Center in Costa Rica.”277  “For 
Pacheco [the Uber Regional General Manager in Mexico], Uber is not 
outside the law and, in fact, is looking for a dialogue with the Colombian 
authorities to define a form of regulation.”278  “In addition, he said that it is 
important to differentiate the shared mobility service from traditional 
transport systems, which have existed for more than 20 years.”279  “He said 
that Uber pays taxes in Colombia and that, in case of regulation, he would be 
willing to contribute more.”280  “If, as its directors hope, a change of 
government opens the doors to a more fruitful dialogue, Uber would soon 
have the opportunity to operate in Colombia under the protection of a modern 
legal framework.”281  
“The debate about the legality of Uber is worldwide, which is why the 
platform tries to work with governments to seek a regulation that, according 
to the firm, allows conditions of competition to be the same for them and for 
taxis.”282  “Justin Kintz, [Uber's] vice-president of Public Policy and 
Communications, points out that Bogotá was the first city in Latin America 
where they arrived five years ago and the issue is still not regulated, but there 
are 46 cities in the world where there is already clarity in the rules of the 
game.”283 
2.  The Experience in Costa Rica 
Uber has been operating in Costa Rica for two years, generating turmoil 
in the public transport sector.284  In particular, “the main opposition to Uber 
in Costa Rica is the Union of Costa Rican Taxi Drivers (UTC), which has 
existed since the 1960s,” and which activity has been made legal by the Costa 
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“Costa Rica, since the 1980s, has been considered to have a highly 
inefficient public transport system.”286  It was “in response to this critical 
situation that the current government promoted a series of legislative reforms 
aimed at modernizing the system of remunerated transport of buses and 
taxis.”287  “At the beginning of 2000, in the midst of the these transformations 
of public transport,” the Public Transport Council was created, together with 
the enactment of the Law No. 7969/2000, regulating the Public Service of 
Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles.288  
While it was believed that the taxi system had managed to complete its 
modernization, “. . . a proliferation in private transport services occurred, 
creating social tensions [especially] with those who provided the service in a 
regulated manner, [meaning taxis], in accordance with the provisions of Law 
No. 7969.”289  The Legislative Assembly promoted a series of reforms “that 
concluded in 2011 with the enactment of Law No. 8955, [regulating the] . . . 
Public Service of Remunerated Transport of People in Vehicles, . . .  that 
gave way to a new form of individual public transport, which was called the 
Special Stable Taxi Service permit, better known by its acronym 
SEETAXI.”290 
The entry, in the recent years, of technology platform companies 
brought new challenges into the Costa Rica legislation, currently endowed 
with a legal framework designed to regulate traditional business models, such 
as taxis.291  This is one of the reasons why the Legislative Assembly, together 
with the Executive Power, deemed it necessary to provide the country with a 
new legislation.292  On January 23, 2019, the deputies introduced a new 
reform project regulating Uber in Costa Rica —as well as other shared 
transport app— and updated the taxi mode.293  The reform project had the 
aim of regulating the activity carried out by Uber, taxis and future actors 
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entering the Costa Rican market, which provides services of remunerated 
transport of people, using the so-called “collaborative digital platforms.”294  
The Legislative Assembly, in its exposure of the motifs, underlined how 
the advances in Internet communications, smartphones and online 
applications have facilitated the development and adoption of paid passenger 
transport, thus improving mobility.295  This type of service, offered by 
technology platform companies, has led nations globally to continually 
review their legislation and public policies.296  In other words, States had to 
ensure that the national legislations reflect the current state of the economy 
and guarantees compliance with legal responsibilities, citizen safety and the 
rights of people who integrate this new type of initiative, under a scheme of 
fair competition.297   
The President of the Republic of Costa Rica, Carlos Alvarado, has 
declared that the government’s commitment, with this reform project, was to 
advance in a system where taxis and transportation technology platforms 
coexist in conditions of fair competition.298  Among the most relevant points, 
raised in the Reform, is the fact that Transport Platform Companies (EPT), 
such as Uber, must pay “13% of value added tax (VAT) as well as 8.5% for 
remittances abroad.”299  In addition, they will be declared as public 
transportation services and must be registered with the Public Transportation 
Council (CTP) for legal operation in the country.300  Based on the resources 
generated by the EPT, a standard of 3% of the operation would be established 
to create a National Mobility Fund for the modernization of public 
transportation.301  Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Minister of Public Works and 
Transport (MOPT) described the project as “balanced” and recalled the 
importance of regulating technological platforms where many citizens find 
employment.302  To draft the proposal, the Executive Branch investigated the 
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matter in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, London, Madrid and Mexico 
City, where it found an agreement for the coexistence of services.303 
What will happen to Uber in Costa Rica is uncertain.304  Nonetheless, 
Uber claims that it has been working “within a framework of legality and 
seeking to be part of the development of Costa Rica.”305  Uber will keep 
asking the government to listen to the multiple voices that call for the 
existence of “a regulation that promotes innovation, development and 
technology.”306 
D.  The Comparative Paragraph 
It is obvious, given the analysis above, that it would be wrong to think 
that Uber and its regulations could be traced back to traditional national 
transport regulations.307  
The legal battles in recent years in Europe and Latin American have 
demonstrated the need for governments to rethink their approach to new 
technologies, and review their regulatory instruments to address today's 
challenges.308 
The arrival of Uber internationally has created turbulence in national 
legislatures who, taken by surprise, had to understand the complexity of the 
phenomenon and find rules that could regulate these technological and 
collaborative platforms.309  Governments had to settle disputes arising from 
the resistance of traditional transport operators and local authorities.310  For 
this reason, governments have been called upon to make decisions.311  “The 
demand for sharing services is insatiable and growing, as consumers 
increasingly rely on technological tools to meet their needs, even in the face 
of their illegality.”312  Therefore, banning new platforms from progress is not 
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a long-term solution.313  Rather, sharing services should be made transparent, 
formalized, and regulated.314 
In the European Union, as in Latin America, creating legislative 
uniformity seems to be difficult to achieve.315  Technology platforms like 
Uber function generally the same everywhere, regardless of where their users 
are located; however, the external effects on local economies appear to be 
significantly different.316  This is the reason why different policies are needed 
for different cities, and even more so for countries in Europe and Latin 
America.317  However, while many European and South American 
governments have had a mentality of opposition to new forms of innovation 
to replace traditional systems, this is slowly giving way to deregulation, 
opening up the market to new players.318  Allowing technology platforms to 
operate alongside traditional operators will remain a pure political 
decision.319  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
“The Uber case fully embodies an aspiration . . . : that of being modern 
and in step with market and technology.”320  “The market tends to age the 
rules” causing the law to risks being obsolete.321  This Note shows how Uber 
“did not have the space to express itself as it could.”322  In fact, “instead of 
enhancing the value of innovation, there have been different requests, 
interests and considerations, which place the emphasis not only on the 
already detected unfair competition, but also on the lack of logic of sharing, 
on the lucrative purpose of the new entrant, and so on.”323 
Undoubtedly, the opportunities evidenced by the “Uber revolution are 
great, connected to the development of the market, to efficiency, to economic 
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the law must change, in order to preserve its usefulness.325  The courts may 
also be called upon to suggest solutions to make the legal apparatus more 
suitable to face the challenge.326   
All that remains, is to wait for national legislatures aware of the fact that 
the delay creates a never-ending jurisprudential quagmire and expands the 
function of the Courts beyond their own institutional mission.327 
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